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The Impact of the Supreme Court 
on Trends in Economic Policy Making 
in the United States Courts of Appeals 
Donald R. Songer 
University of South Carolina 
Previous impact research has primarily investigated controversial civil liberties decisions. 
The present study examines the response of the United States Courts of Appeals to changes 
in the labor and antitrust policies announced by the Supreme Court between 1950 and 1977. 
Significant impact was discovered. In each policy area, the decisional trends of the courts 
of appeals underwent a significant change after each of two policy shifts on the Supreme 
Court. Changes in the decisional trends of the courts of appeal were in the predicted direction 
even after controls were introduced for judges' party and holdover effects. 
L a recent assessment of research to date in judicial impact, Johnson 
and Canon (1984) suggest that too much attention has been given to 
following up a very few dramatic Supreme Court decisions. They argue 
that "in focusing on the extraordinary, we have forgotten the ordinary. 
We believe a complete understanding of the process in the implementation 
and impact of judicial policies must also include data about cases less 
heralded but nonetheless still important" (1984, p. ix). This concentration 
on the dramatic has meant that most empirical research dealt with the 
impact of a highly biased sample of Supreme Court policies: mainly 
controversial civil liberties decisions-especially those of the Warren 
Court (Baum, 1978). Wasby's (1970) admonition more than a decade ago 
that there was a need for more analysis of the impact of the Court on 
economic policy has gone virtually unheeded. Even though the Supreme 
Court devotes considerable energy to economic policy, the impact of its 
work in this field has been virtually ignored (Baum, 1977, p. 132). 
A potential danger of such a limited research focus is that the overall 
impact of the Supreme Court may be seriously underestimated. 
Controversial policies may be precisely those in which the impact of the 
Supreme Court on lower courts is at its minimum (Baum, 1978, p. 210; 
Johnson and Canon, 1984, pp. 58-60). Shifting the focus of analysis to the 
Court's economic policy-making may contribute to a more balanced 
assessment of its overall impact on lower courts. While substantively 
important, the Court's economic decisions have rarely generated the 
'The author wishes to express his appreciation for the Project '87 grant which partially 
funded the research reported in this paper. 
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degree of passion and controversy that have followed some of its decisions 
on race relations and criminal procedure. Consequently, their impact may 
be greater. For example, Wasby (1970, p. 103) suggests that "an area of 
law in which it is often speculated that considerable impact has occurred 
is antitrust, but much of what has been written is speculation; we are 
without studies to match the speculation." 
The present study attempts to redress partially the balance in impact 
studies with an analysis of the impact of the Supreme Court on economic 
policy-making in the United States Courts of Appeals. The focus is on 
the labor and antitrust decisions of the courts of appeals from 1950 through 
1977. 
Much of the literature on the impact of the Supreme Court on lower 
courts has dealt with their compliance with specific decisions of the 
Supreme Court. Although such studies have illuminated some significant 
problems, a compliance focus inevitably misses much of the dynamics 
of the relationships between courts in our federal system. Lower courts 
may fail to support the basic policy of the Supreme Court without being 
overtly noncompliant with any specific decision (see Wasby, 1970, ch. 2 
for a discussion of the problem). As Beatty (1972, p. 261) puts it, there 
are many ways for courts to "avoid, mitigate or nullify the ruling or advice 
of the Court" which stop short of overt defiance or noncompliance. 
Therefore, to gain a more complete understanding of the significance of 
the constitutional rules announced by the Supreme Court, a broader 
concept of impact needs to be used. A further problem with the use of 
a compliance model is that the focus on a few selected decisions is too 
narrow to gauge the impact of the Court on a given policy area. Canon 
(1973) maintains that the central significance of the Court for 
constitutional development is not the specific decisions it makes but the 
broad policies it fashions from a series of decisions. Baum (1977) expands 
on this idea to argue that much of an appellate court's policy leadership 
is exercised through the establishment of decisional trends that signal its 
inclination without creating a complete set of explicit rules of law. He 
suggests that there is a great need for research designed to measure the 
response of lower courts to these more general "decisional trends" of 
appellate courts in a wide variety of policy areas. 
The analysis reported below examines the policy leadership exerted by 
the Supreme Court on the labor and antitrust decisional trends in the 
United States Courts of Appeals. It is generally believed that judicial 
decisions which lack clarity because of their complexity are less likely to 
have positive impact on the courts below (Johnson and Canon, 1984, p. 
49). Since labor and antitrust policies are by nature complex (Johnson and 
Canon, 1984, p. 32), it might be speculated that the impact of the Supreme 
Court in these policy areas will be relatively modest. However, if the 
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direction of Supreme Court policy is substantially altered through a series 
of decisions, the overall change in the decisional trends of the Court should 
be quite clear even if the details of some specific decisions remain 
somewhat ambiguous. Therefore, the capability of the Supreme Court to 
influence the decisional trends of lower courts should not be hampered 
by the complexity of its decisions. Since labor and antitrust decisions of 
the Supreme Court have not generally stimulated widespread intense 
controversy and since there are no other obvious environmental pressures 
on the lower courts to disregard Supreme Court policy leadership, it is 
expected that the Court will have a substantial impact on the labor and 
antitrust decisions of the courts of appeals. Specifically, it is hypothesized 
that after any statistically significant change in the percentage of liberal 
decisions announced by the Supreme Court in either of the policy areas 
under investigation, there will be a statistically significant change in the 
same direction in the percentage of liberal decisions announced by the 
United States Courts of Appeals. 
DATA AND METHODS 
The initial analysis of the impact of the Supreme Court was based on 
all of the labor and antitrust decisions of both the Supreme Court and 
the United States Courts of Appeals that were published with full opinions 
(including per curiam opinions) from 1950 through 1977.1 The sample of 
antitrust decisions of the courts of appeals was extended backwards in 
time to 1947 after a preliminary examination suggested that there were 
too few cases in the earlier period studied to permit adequate analysis.2 
During this period there were a total of 160 such Supreme Court and 1153 
appeals court decisions in the area of antitrust policy and 221 Supreme 
Court and 4454 appeals court labor decisions. Decisions were classified 
as liberal or conservative following the widely used definition of liberalism 
most fully described by Goldman (1966). 
The first step in analysis was to compute the percentage of liberal 
decisions made by the Supreme Court in each calendar year for each 
1 Labor cases consisted of all cases which involved the resolution of a significant issue 
included in the "labor relations" topic of the West Key Number System, except those in 
which an individual as plaintiff raised an equal protection claim against a union or 
corporation. Suits between unions were also excluded. Most labor cases therefore involved 
disputes between a union and a company or between employees and their employer. 
Antitrust cases involved all civil suits in which the plaintiff alleged violation of an antitrust 
law (primarily the Sherman or Clayton Acts) or in which the defendant raised a counter 
claim based on the antitrust laws to resist a patent infringement or breach of contract claim. 
Included in both the labor and antitrust categories were appeals from federal regulatory 
agencies (e.g., the National Labor Relations Board) and the Federal district courts. 
2 A list of the citations of the cases used in analysis may be obtained from the author. 
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policy area (see appendix).3 It was next necessary to determine precisely 
when and to what extent the decisional trends in Supreme Court labor 
and antitrust policy-making actually did change. An examination of the 
data suggests that there were two dramatic changes in the decisional trends 
of the Supreme Court in each policy area. In labor policy, the Supreme 
Court became significantly more liberal after 1958 and then took a decisive 
turn back to the right after 1969. Overall, the Supreme Court announced 
liberal decisions in 54.3% of its opinions in the period 1950-1958; 79.8% were 
liberal in 1959-1969, and 43.0% were liberal in 1970-77. A difference of 
proportions test (Z) demonstrates that both of these changes are 
statistically significant at the .001 level. 
More traditional analyses also suggest that significant changes in 
Supreme Court policy occurred at approximately the same time. For 
example, Theodore J. St. Antoine states that the Warren Court's "main 
achievement in the labor field involved a simple but fundamental 
restructuring of intergovernmental relations. What the court did . .. was 
to nationalize the regulation of labor relations in industries affecting 
interstate commerce" (1968, p. 126). The first definitive statement of this 
new policy came in the 1959 case of San Diego Building Trades Council 
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (St. Antoine, 1968, p. 128; Shapiro, 1964, p. 85). 
The shift back to a more conservative interpretation of labor policy began 
in 1970 when the Burger Court announced its decision in Boys Markets 
Inc. v. Retail Clerk Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, the first of several decisions 
which expressly overruled two of the Warren Court's prounion decisions 
and undermined three others (St. Antoine, 1983, p. 166). 
In antitrust policy the Supreme Court decisional trends became 
decidely more liberal after 1956 and then turned back in a conservative 
direction after 1973. During the 1950-1956 period, 40.6% of all Supreme 
Court decisions were liberal. The liberal proportion jumped to 79.5% for 
the 1957-1973 period and then fell back to 37.0% for the 1974-1977 period. 
Both changes in the proportion of liberal decisions are significant at the 
.001 level. 
Traditional analyses also lead to the conclusion that the Warren and 
Burger Courts presided over significant shifts in Supreme Court antitrust 
policy. Kauper writes that "no one could quarrel with the simple assertion 
that the so-called 'Warren Court' has had a significant, if indeed not 
extraordinary, impact on the development of antitrust laws" (1968, p. 134). 
The first of the Warren Court's major antitrust decisions, which marked 
the first time that the Court has applied the Clayton Act to vertical 
mergers, occurred in 1957 in the case of United States v. DuPont, 353 U.S. 
586 (Shapiro, 1964, pp. 276-77). The DuPont case was quickly followed 
I Each decision of either the Supreme Court or the courts of appeals which affirmed in 
part and reversed in part the decision below was scored as half liberal and half conservative. 
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by a number of cases, such as the 1958 decision in Northern Pacific Ry. 
Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, in which the Warren Court declared a 
wide variety of vertical restraints to be illegal and systematically began 
to resolve apparent conflicts between patent and antitrust laws in favor 
of the latter (Kauper, 1968, p. 136). The swing back to the right began 
with two key decisions in 1974. Markovits argues that the 1974 decision 
in United States v. Marine Bancorporation, 418 U.S. 602, was the first of 
several in which the Burger Court "indicated that the test of antitrust 
legality is the effect of the acts in question on competition rather than their 
impact on populist democracy or the independence and survival of small 
businessmen" (1983, p. 180). Also in 1974, the Burger Court announced 
its decision in United States v. General Dynamics Corporation, 415 U.S. 
486, which was the key case on horizontal mergers which repudiated the 
"Warren Court's apparent conclusion that virtually all horizontal mergers 
are anticompetitive and hence unlawful" (Markovits, 1983, p. 186). 
After determining that Supreme Court policy did, in fact, change 
significantly in each policy area, decisional trends on the courts of appeals 
were examined to determine whether they changed in the same direction 
in the period immediately following the change in Supreme Court policy. 
The basic unit of analysis was the percentage of liberal decisions 
announced by the courts of appeals in each policy area for each calendar 
year (a listing of the results by year is provided in the appendix). The 
periods used to analyze appeals court decisions are lagged one year to 
assure that appeals court judges had time to become familiar with changes 
in Supreme Court policy. The basic test of the hypothesis was to determine 
whether the proportion of liberal decisions on the courts of appeals 
changed to a statistically significant degree after the policy change on the 
Supreme Court. Since it is predicted that the decisional trends of the 
Supreme Court and the courts of appeals will change in the same direction, 
a one-tailed difference of proportions test is utilized. 
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS 
The data in table 1 demonstrate that with a one-year time lag, the labor 
decisional trends on the courts of appeals followed the change in Supreme 
Court policy as predicted by the hypothesis. After the dramatic increase 
in Supreme Court liberalism, the percentage of liberal decisions in the 
courts of appeals increased by 9.1%, a difference that is significant at the 
.001 level. However, the response by the courts of appeals following the 
Supreme Court's return to a more conservative orientation is somewhat 
ambiguous. Although the courts of appeals also became more 
conservative, the magnitude of the change was much more modest, and 
the difference failed to reach the .05 level of significance. 
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TABLE 1 
PROPORTION OF LIBERAL DECISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 
DURING PERIODS OF CHANGING SUPREME COURT POLICY: LABOR CASES 
PERIOD % LIBERAL (N) Z 
1950-59 51.0% (1113) 5.06 p<.001 
1960-70 60.1 (2194) 
1971-77 58.1 (1147) 1.11 p=.l 
The data in table 2 also support the hypothesis. Following the Warren 
Court's adoption of a decidedly more liberal antitrust policy, the output 
of the courts of appeals also became more liberal. The increase of 8.5% 
is significant at the .02 level. The response of the courts of appeals 
following the turn back to the right by the Supreme Court was also 
decisive. For the period 1974-1977, the proportion of liberal decisions 
rendered by the courts of appeals fell 8.6% from its previous level, a 
difference that is significant at the .02 level. 
TABLE 2 
PROPORTION OF LIBERAL DECISIONS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 
DURING PERIODS OF CHANGING SUPREME COURT POLICY: ANTITRUST CASES 
PERIOD % LIBERAL (N) Z 
1947-57 34.2% (199) 2.18 p<.02 
1958-74 42.7 (731) 
1975-77 34.1 (223) 2.26 p<.02 
Although the findings are not without some ambiguity, they do provide 
considerable support for the hypothesis. Following each of the four 
changes in the decisional trends of the Supreme Court, the trends in the 
courts of appeals moved in the same direction. In three of the cases the 
differences were statistically significant and in the remaining case the 
differences were only moderately less than that required for statistical 
significance. 
Although these changes in the decisional trends on the courts of appeals 
are consistent with the hypothesis of Supreme Court impact, alternative 
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explanations are possible. It is well established that there are frequently 
partisan differences in the voting behavior of appeals court judges 
(Goldman, 1966, 1975), and in fact, party differences are evident in the 
data analyzed above. In labor cases, 57.0% of the votes cast by Democratic 
judges were liberal compared to 52.0% for Republican judges-a 
difference which is significant at the .001 level. In antitrust policy 
Democrats also cast liberal votes more frequently than their Republican 
counterparts: 42.7% compared to 38.5%. These differences are significant 
at the .01 level. The existence of such partisan differences raises the 
possibility that the changes in the decisional trends of the courts of appeals 
may be due to changes in the partisan composition of the lower courts 
rather than to any Supreme Court influence. 
In order to assess this alternative explanation, the votes of individual 
judges are analyzed in each time period with a control for the party of 
the appointing president. The data are displayed in tables 3 and 4. The 
TABLE 3 
CHANGES OVER TIME IN THE PROPORTION OF LIBERAL VOTES CAST BY 
DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN JUDGES ON THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS: 
LABOR CASES 
REPUBLICANS PERIOD % LIBERAL (N) Z 
1950-59 46.4% (1245) 
4.82 p<.001 
1960-70 54.6 (2780) 
1.69 p<.05 
1971-77 51.9 (1529) 
DEMOCRATS PERIOD % LIBERAL (N) Z 
1950-59 52.0% (1688) 
4.87 p<.001 
1960-70 59.8 (2959) 
1.41 p=.08 
1971-77 57.4 (1167) 
changes in the voting patterns of Republican judges are consistent with 
the hypothesis of Supreme Court impact. For both labor and antitrust 
policy, the proportion of liberal Republican votes increased to a 
statistically significant degree after the Warren Court policies became 
established and then decreased to a statistically significant extent after the 
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policy changes adopted by the Burger Court. Democratic judges also 
followed the trends set by the Supreme Court in both labor and antitrust 
policy, and the magnitude of the changes was significant at the .01 level 
in three of the four cases. Although the proportion of the liberal votes cast 
by Democratic judges is higher than the corresponding figure for 
Republican judges in each of the three time periods for both policy areas, 
it is significant that the trends over time for both parties follow the 
direction of the changes enacted by the Supreme Court. 
TABLE 4 
CHANGES OVER TIME IN THE PROPORTION OF LIBERAL VOTES CAST BY 
DEMOCRATIC AND REPUBLICAN JUDGES ON THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS: 
ANTITRUST CASES 
REPUBLICANS PERIOD % LIBERAL (N) Z 
1947-57 30.1% (186) 
2.92 p<.Ol 
1958-74 41.5 (1023) 
2.43 p<.Ol 
1975-77 34.2 (360) 
DEMOCRATS PERIOD % LIBERAL (N) Z 
1947-57 37.5% (371) 
2.93 p<.Ol 
1958-74 46.3 (961) 
2.77 p<.Ol 
1975-77 36.6 (262) 
This finding that the voting patterns in both parties followed Supreme 
Court trends strengthens the support for the proposition that the court 
has had a significant impact on the decisional trends of the courts of 
appeals and that the observed changes in the courts of appeals were not 
due to personnel turnover. However, the use of a party control is only 
a partial test of turnover effects. Since significant presidential 
appointment effects have been noted even within parties for federal 
judges (Carp and Rowland, 1983), the possibility remains that the 
observed changes were produced by the appointment of judges after the 
Supreme Court policy shift who were ideologically more in tune with the 
new policy than were previously appointed judges. Although no 
independent measure of judges' ideologies was available, this alternative 
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was explored by comparing the voting tendencies of holdover judges 
before and after the changes in Supreme Court policy.4 Such an analysis, 
however, supports the original hypothesis rather than the alternative 
explanation that new judges were responsible for changes in the decisional 
trends of the courts of appeals. In labor policy, the proportion of liberal 
votes cast by holdover judges increased from 49.6% prior to 1960 to 57.3% 
in the middle period and then decreased to 55.9% after 1970.5 In antitrust 
policy, the proportion of liberal votes cast by holdover judges increased 
from 37.8% to 46.8%. The holdovers from the period 1958 to 1974 decreased 
their support for liberal outcomes from 43.9% to 35.2% after 1974.6 
If the Supreme Court does have a significant effect on the decisions 
of appeals courts judges, then policy changes adopted by the Court should 
create new precedents which authoritatively settle some previously 
unsettled questions and/or which require that previously settled questions 
now be decided in a different manner. Songer (1982) has argued that a 
significant proportion of the cases decided by the courts of appeals should 
be classified as "consensual" cases because the precedents relevant to the 
decision are so clear and so generally perceived to be binding that all 
judges, regardless of their ideology, will feel constrained to decide them 
in the same way. His findings suggested that unanimous affirmances by 
the courts of appeals are almost always such consensual cases. But if 
Supreme Court policy change results in new, clear, binding precedents, 
the cases which would be consensual in one time period might not be 
consensual in the next period. Therefore, the decisional trends even among 
these "consensual" cases in the courts of appeals should follow changes 
in the decisional trends of the Supreme Court if the thesis of the present 
study is correct. To test this proposition, the decisional trends in the courts 
of appeals for unanimous affirmances of the district court or regulatory 
agency decision below were analyzed. 
The results support the original hypothesis. For both labor and antitrust 
cases, the proportion of liberal decisions consistently moves in the 
I A judge was classified as a "holdover" or a "new" judge on the basis of their appointing 
president rather than their individual date of appointment. Although such a convention, 
necessitated by the way in which the data were coded, may introduce some inaccuracies 
(e.g., for labor policy, those few Eisenhower judges appointed in 1960 were classified as 
holdovers), it does not seem likely that it would significantly affect the results. The only 
break point between time periods located in the middle of a presidential administration is 
the division of the first two periods for antitrust policy. Consequently a separate analysis 
was performed on all Eisenhower appointees, and none were classified as holdover judges. 
Eisenhower judges increased their proportion of liberal antitrust votes from 30.6% to 41.3% 
after 1957, a change significant at the .05 level. 
5 For the first change, the combined N=6601, Z=6.42, P<.001. The second change does 
not reach the .05 level of significance (Z=1.05). 
6 For the first change, the combined N=848, Z=2.73, P<.001. For the second change, the 
combined N=2571, Z=3.78, P<.001. 
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expected direction. For antitrust policy both changes are statistically 
significant, while for labor policy only the first change reaches at least 
the .05 level of significance 
In summary, the analysis reported above suggests that the Supreme 
Court exercises considerable impact on the general trends in economic 
policy-making in the United States Courts of Appeals. Even when analysis 
was confined to judges of a single party, holdover judges, or consensual 
cases, the trends in the courts of appeals followed the changes in decisional 
trends of the Supreme Court. The findings reported above of shifts in the 
decisional trends of the courts of appeals following policy changes in the 
output of the Supreme Court do not provide definitive proof of causation. 
It remains possible, for example, that statutory changes or changes in 
Justice Department prosecution policy were responsible for the shifts on 
both courts. However, in the absence of any direct evidence to support 
these alternative explanations, they appear less plausible than the 
hypothesis of Supreme Court impact. 
The major unexplained finding was the failure of the change in the labor 
decisions of the courts of appeals after 1970 to reach normal standards 
of statistical significance. The data displayed in table 3 suggest that this 
failure was due solely to the response of Democratic judges. Although their 
voting decisions moved in the expected direction, the magnitude of the 
change was quite modest. A tentative explanation of these results might 
be found in the suggestion of Carp and Rowland (1983) that the guidelines 
coming from the Burger Court were more ambiguous than those 
emanating from the Warren Court. Consequently, judges may have gained 
relatively more freedom to take their decision-making cues from personal 
and partisan values after 1970 rather than from guidelines set forth by the 
High Court. 
7For antitrust policy, the proportion of liberal decisions increased from 22.3% (N=121) 
to 30.0% (N=417) in the middle period and then falls to 18.9%. For the first change, Z=1.67, 
P<.05. For the second change, Z=2.27, P<.02. For labor policy the proportion of liberal 
decisions for each period is 66.6% (N-598), 73.0% (N=1187), and 70.2% (N=662). For the first 
change, Z=2.78, P<.01. For the second change, Z=1.27, P=.10. 
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APPENDIX 
PERCENTAGE OF LIBERAL DECISIONS IN THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS BY YEAR AND POLICY AREA 
Labor Cases Antitrust Cases 
Supreme Court Appeals Court Supreme Court Appeals Court 
Year % Liberal N % Liberal N % Liberal N % Liberal N 
1950 29% 7 33% 63 33% 6 36% 22 
1951 16 3 40 85 33 6 33 9 
1952 33 9 58 92 0 2 55 11 
1953 67 12 52 150 16 6 31 18 
1954 100 3 55 166 57 7 29 29 
1955 50 5 57 122 100 3 37 19 
1956 64 14 48 128 50 2 40 29 
1957 62 13 47 94 80 5 32 25 
1958 50 4 59 99 40 5 46 26 
1959 67 9 48 121 83 6 39 32 
1960 85 13 51 154 100 4 43 28 
1961 83 3 56 150 50 4 35 24 
1962 81 13 61 167 89 9 38 33 
1963 67 9 60 249 57 7 43 35 
1964 100 13 57 189 100 8 53 44 
1965 64 11 58 160 60 5 43 38 
1966 50 6 60 199 100 6 45 47 
1967 100 8 63 326 100 10 51 40 
1968 75 4 57 153 75 8 30 42 
1969 100 5 63 216 89 9 44 40 
1970 60 5 66 230 100 1 51 59 
1971 42 7 56 250 70 5 42 53 
1972 44 8 64 155 67 6 48 53 
1973 60 5 59 143 71 7 43 62 
1974 29 12 62 150 50 8 29 75 
1975 50 7 57 149 20 5 30 85 
1976 43 7 12 4 
1977 33 6 50 6 
REFERENCES 
Beatty, Jerry K. 1972. State Court Evasion of United States Supreme Court Mandates During 
the Last Decade of the Warren Court. Valparaiso Law Review, 6:260-85. 
Baum, Lawrence. 1977. Judicial Impact as a Form of Policy Implementation. In John A. 
Gardiner, ed., Public Law and Public Policy. New York: Praeger. 
. 1978. Lower Court Responses to Supreme Court Decisions-Reconsidering a 
Negative Picture. The Justice System Journal, 3:208-19. 
_ 1980. Responses of Federal District Judges to Court of Appeals Policies: An 
Exploration. Western Political Quarterly, 33:217-24. 
Canon, Bradley C. 1973. Reactions of State Supreme Courts to a U.S. Supreme Court Civil 
Liberties Decision. Law and Society Review, 8:109-34. 
IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT ON ECONOMIC POLICY MAKING 841 
Carp, Robert A., and C. K. Rowland. 1983. Policymaking and Politics in Federal District 
Courts. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. 
Goldman, Sheldon. 1966. Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961- 
1964. American Political Science Review, 60:370-85. 
. 1975. Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals Revisited. American 
Political Science Review, 69:491-506. 
Johnson, Charles A., and Bradley C. Canon. 1984. Judicial Policies: Implementation and 
Impact. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press. 
Kauper, Thomas E. 1968. The Warren Court and the Antitrust Laws: Of Economics, 
Populism, and Cynicism. In Richard H. Sayler, Barry B. Boyer, and Robert E. Gooding, 
Jr., The Warren Court: A Critical Analysis. New York: Chelsea House. 
Markovits, R. S. 1983. The Burger Court, Antitrust, and Economic Analysis. In Vincent Blasi, 
The Burger Court: The Counter Revolution That Wasn't. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 
St. Antoine, Theodore J. 1968. Judicial Valour and the Warren Court's Labor Decisions. In 
The Warren Court: A Critical Analysis. See Kauper, 1968. 
. 1983. Individual Rights in the Workplace: The Burger Court and Labor Law. In 
The Burger Court. See Markovits, 1983. 
Shapiro, Martin. 1964. Law and Politics in the Supreme Court. Glencoe, IL: Free Press. 
Songer, Donald R. 1982. Consensual and Nonconsensual Decisions in Unanimous Opinions 
of the United States Courts of Appeals. American Journal of Political Science, 26:225- 
39. 
Wasby, Stephen L. 1970. The Impact of the United States Supreme Court: Some 
Perspectives. Homewood, IL: Dorsey. 
